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EVOLUTION OF THE "ACCIDENT' REQUIREMENT
IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE
By JANms M. GAvEs*
It is a customary statutory mandate that in order to be com-
pensable under a Workmen's Compensation Act an injury must
be sustained by the employee "by accident." The language of
the Kentucky statute itself has not been watered down at all, but
in recent years the plain meaning of the phrase has suffered such
erosion in judicial review that it is now equated with such phrases
as "specifically identified effort" and "work connected disability."
The purpose of this article is to trace the process by which this
material change has occurred.
The requirement that a compensable injury be accidental in
character has been adopted by most legislative and judicial
bodies which have considered the subject. The usual statutory
phrase, taken from the original British act, is injury "by acci-
dent."1
The earliest Workmen's Compensation Act in Kentucky pro-
vided that:
"It [the act] shall affect the liability of the employers subject
thereto to their employees for personal injuries sustained by
the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment or for death resulting from such accidental
injury; provided however, that personal injury by accident
as herein defined shall not include diseases except where the
disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury
by accident,.. "2
The Court of Appeals in an early case stated that the word
"accident," as employed in the first section of the Act, means
"something unusual, unexpected, and undesigned." In a later
case alleging an occupational disease, thus invoking the require-
ment that the injury be traumatic as well as accidental, "traumatic
* A.B., LL.B., University of Louisville; Senior Partner, Boehl, Stopher,
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1 1 A. LARSON, TaE LAws OF WoRmEcN's COMPENSATiON 511 (1952).
2 Acts of the General Assembly (1916) ch. 33, § 1.
a Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152 (1918).
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injury" was said to "imply the presence of physical force."4 In
the same opinion the Court again defined accidental as "an
unusual, unexpected and undesigned event," and further ob-
served that in order for the accident requirement of the statute
to be met, the episode must be traceable "to a definite time, place,
and cause."( In Kentucky Stone Co. v. Phillips,7 the Court stated
flatly that in order for an injury to be classified as the result of
an "accident" within the meaning of the Act, it must not only be
traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, but ". . . must be
assignable to a determinate or single act, identified in space or
time."
This view was maintained as late as 1954 in a case involving
the development of a ganglion cyst on the employee's wrist while
sanding gun-stocks at work, the Court held that since the condi-
tion developed gradually over a period of time, it failed to satisfy
the statutory requirement.8 The Court emphasized that the cyst
was not connected with "any particular injury and it is not
traceable to any definite time,"9 and further, that "no definite
blow, jerk or strain to the wrist"' has been established. The
opinion clearly reflected an intention on the part of the Court
to require the happening of a specific incident at a definite time.
Thus, it was pointed out that although the claimant "did not
notice the cyst until the morning of April 12th, and although it
may have appeared suddenly at that time,"" it was apparent that
the cyst was merely the tangible evidence of a condition caused
by the repeated use of the wrist over a period of weeks.
The first indication of a trend away from strict construction
of the statute was discernible in Rowe v. Semet-Solvay Division
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp.,2 where the employee simply indi-
cated that he experienced pain in his back while loading the last
car and was unable to pinpoint the injury to a more specific time
4 Great Atlantic and Pacific Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 270, 46 S.W.2d 87, 89
(1932) quoting the Court in Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 688, 247 S.W.
972, 974 (1923).
G Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W.2d 87,
88 (1932).
6 Id. at 89.
7294 Ky. 576, 172 S.W.2d 216 (1943).
8 Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Parker, 267 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1954).
9Id. at 748.
10 Id.
11Id.
-12 268 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1954).
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or to any single act; and in Ironton Fire Brick Company v.
Madden3 where the employee, after helping other workmen move
heavy slate for an undisclosed period of time, announced that his
back was hurting and that he would have to rest. In both in-
stances these meager facts were considered sufficient to satisfy
the "accident" requirement of the Act.
Finally, in Adams v. Bryant4 the Court, while retaining the
fiction that an accident must be traceable to a definite time and
place, enlarged the time element to a period of twenty-four hours,
during which the employee exerted himself in an effort to rescue
fellow employees who were trapped in a mine. The Adams case
represents a distinct turning point and requires some elaboration.
On February 14, 1950, four employees, including Bryant, were
working in Adam's mine when a cave-in occurred. Bryant's
father-in-law was trapped and another employee was killed.
Bryant and the fourth man were not injured and they immediately
began efforts to rescue the entombed men. The rescue endeavors
continued for twenty-four hours during which time Bryant
worked both sides inside and outside the mine without rest.
On the following day and almost exactly twenty-four hours after
commencement of the rescue operations, Bryant collapsed as he
was leaving the mine. He died five or six hours later. A physician
testified that he died from "overexertion, exposure and nervous
shock."-5
The Board denied the claim of Bryant's dependents on the
ground that his death was not the proximate result of a personal
injury sustained by the employee by accident and was not of a
traumatic nature. The Court of Appeals on review pointed out
that the "personal injury" requirement of the statute, where no
disease was involved, did not necessitate "traumatic injury" and
accordingly had no difficulty in finding that Bryant had sustained
an injury. It was stated that:
[T]he word injury, when used without any qualifying words,
such as traumatic, is to be given its broadest possible scope.
... [T]he Legislature did not intend to limit injuries in the
13285 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1955).
14274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955).
15 Id. at 792.
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absence of a disease to only those injuries of a traumatic
nature.'0
After reaching the opinion that Bryant died as a result of a
"personal injury," the Court then approached the question of
whether such injury was accidental. Noting the previous decision
defining accident as something "unusual, unexpected, and unde-
signed... traceable to a definite time, place, and cause,"-7 the
Court jumped to the conclusion that Bryant's shock, overexertion
and exposure were, indeed, within the meaning of the word
accident, "at least to the extent that it was unexpected and
unforeseen."'8 The Court had more difficulty, however, in tracing
Bryant's "accident" to a definite time and place. The twenty-
four hour period during which he worked at the rescue operation
was considered short enough or limited enough to satisfy the
definite time requirement. Finally, the Court embraced the view
that the injury need not "result from a single and a specific
occurrence in order to pin down the cause of it."' 9
A considerable amount of statutory destruction was accom-
plished in the Bryant opinion. With one blow the definite time,
place, and cause requirement was stretched beyond recognition
and the determinate or single act condition was totally abolished.
It would now be but a short step to the present practice of
equating "accident" with what the Court terms a "specifically
identified effort" or "work-connected disability."
In an effort to retain the prior construction of the requirement
of an accidental cause, the General Assembly, in the 1956 legisla-
tive session, amended KRS § 342.005(1). The Court had stated in
Bryant that the statute required a traumatic injury only on the
question of causation of disease, not of the accidental nature of
any injury. Accordingly, the legislature moved to remove this
rationale of the Bryant decision by adding the word "traumatic"
in front of the words "personal injury." The effective date of this
amendment was August 1, 1956, but such amendment was dis-
posed of quite easily by the Court by simply characterizing
16 Id. at 793.
17 Id. at 794.
i1 Id.
19 Id.
1970]
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"traumatic" as a "slippery word."20 In Terry v. Associated Stone
Company.2 1, Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, 22 and Johnson v.
Stone,23 the Court developed the present rule that the strain or
exertion causing injury need not be "unusual." On the contrary,
it was held that "a specifically identified effort" which contributes
to injury or damage is sufficient.24
In Johnson v. Stone,25 the Court observed that if a previously
disabled knee, for instance, should be dislocated "in the routine
act of stooping to retrieve a pencil from the office floor,"26 it would
constitute a compensable injury. Here, any connotation of trauma,
overexertion or unusual strain is abolished. The test is simply
whether a specifically identified effort," however easy and routine
it may be" has contributed to a disability that would not have
otherwise occurred at that time.27 The Court states frankly that
what it wants to know is "whether it is likely that the work [not
accident] had anything to do- with bringing on the attack at the
particular time."
28
In Trailer Convoys, Inc. v. Holsclaw,29 a badly divided Court
handed down a decision which probably represents the extreme
result of the judicial trend to eliminate the accident requirement
from the Workmen's Compensation Act. The facts of that case
are simple and brief. The appellee's decedent was a long-haul
truck driver employed by Trailer Convoys, Inc. At the time of
his death, Holsclaw was enroute from Kentucky to California
where he was to deliver a trailer. When he reached a point near
Santa Rosa, New Mexico, he had to stop and wait in line for a
traffic interview which was being conducted by the New Mexico
Highway Department. While stopped and waiting, he experi-
enced a cerebral hemorrhage, went into a coma, and never re-
gained consciousness. There was no trauma, no injury and no
accident.
In the majority opinion in Trailer Convoys the Court was
2 0 Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, 345 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Ky. 1961).
21334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).
22345 S.W.2d 47 Ky. 1961).
23 57 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1960).
2 4 Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Ky. 1960).
25357 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1962).
26 Id. at 846.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 419 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1967).
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content simply to consider the above facts as sufficient to establish
compensability under the rationale of Terry and Grimes.30 In fact,
it was observed in one of the concurring opinioins that but for
Terry and Grimes there would not even be an inference from
which the Court might assume that a "traumatic personal injury
[was] sustained by the employee by accident." 1 It was further
stated in that concurring opinion that the proof was not con-
vincing "that any event had occurred to or involved HoIsclaw
other than the customary and usual experience of a driver of a
truck." The writer of this opinion, although concurring with the
majority, stated that, except in cases of occupational disease, he
... would hold that the Act is not intended to embrace injury
or death unless there is sufficient evidence that it resulted from
an unusual occurrence, as contrasted with the normal stresses
and strains related to the job and the mundane routine activi-
ties connected with the work in which the employee is
engaged.82
In a strong dissenting opinion it was stated that the Court
had so long disregarded the statutory language on this point
that it was now, "awarding compensation for the death of an
employee because per chance he just happened to have a cerebral
hemorrhage while on the job."8 This dissenter noted that
"trauma' and "accident" had been defined and defined many
times in the past, but that the former still meant "a personal
injury resulting from an external force" and the latter still means
"something unusual, unexpected and undesigned" in respect to
cause as distinguished from result.34 Finally, it was observed
that there has been "a wilful and capricious judicial determination
to defy the legislature and not to apply the plain and simple
requirements of a statute" and that "[a] more glaring example of
the abuse of judicial power can be found nowhere in the law of
the state.""'
Are we to conclude from these decisions that mere presence
on the job coupled with the first experience or awareness by the
8oId. at 565.
3l Id. at 566.
821d.
33 Id. at 567.
84 Id. at 570.
85 Id
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employee of a physical abnormality is tantamount to the occur-
rence of a traumatic personal injury by accident? Perhaps not.
In Dupriest v. Tecon Corporation,86 the employee collapsed while
working and died as a result of heart failure. It was a hot day
and the employee was assisting in loading steel piling on a truck
by means of a crane. There was no evidence of any particular
strenuous activity on the part of the employee at the time of and
prior to his collapse. The Circuit Court set aside the Board's
award of compensation benefits to the widow and this was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals on the ground that there was not sub-
stantial evidence that the employee's death was work connected.
In Hutchinson v. Skilton Construction Company,3 7 the employee
died shortly after arriving upon the job on a particular morning.
The testimony was indefinite as to whether the employee did
any work on the morning of his fatal attack. The medical proof
conclusively established that the decedent met his death as a
result of advanced coronary artery arteiosclerosis. The Board, the
Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the contention
that "mere presence on the job, accompanied by the stress and
strain that goes with construction employment, is sufficient to
support an award."a3  The Court of Appeals observed that "the
law clearly requires an applicant to meet the burden of proof by
showing that the decedent's death from a heart attack was work
connected... .,,3 Finally, in Hudson v. Ownes,40 the Court laid
down the rule that:
... where the physical effort of a man's work precipitates his
internal breakdown resulting in disablement, he has sustained
a compensable personal injury within the meaning of our com-
pensation law. Once a condition is accepted as a personal
,injury' it is necessarily accepted as traumatic.41
The Court specifically rejected the so-called "usual" and "unusual"
strain test and noted unconcern with exercises in semantics over
the word "accidental." In short, if an injury or abnormality can
36 396 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965).
37417 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1967).
3sId. at 143.
39 Id.
40439 S.W.2d 565 (1969).
41 Id. at 568.
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be traced to the performance of an employee's work, the claim
will be compensable.
We have, indeed, come a long way from the statutory mandate
of "traumatic personal injury... by accident." An unusual hap-
pening is no longer required, the episode need not be traceable to
a definite time and place, and there need not be evidence of an
external force. The magic phrases of compensability are now
"work-connected event" and "work-connected disability." The
passage of time will undoubtedly teach us whether or not this
progressive evolvement is one of wisdom.
